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SECOND CIRCUIT HOLDS RACIALLY BASED PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES UNCONSTITUTIONAL
McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984)
In McCray v. Abrams,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit sharply limited a prosecutor's racially motivated use of
the peremptory challenge.
An all white jury found McCray, a black defendant, guilty of robbing a
white victim.2 McCray petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,3 challeng-
ing the prosecutor's use of peremptories. 4 During voir dire, the prosecu-
tor allegedly used eight peremptory challenges to remove all minority
venirepersons.5 The defense counsel asserted that several of the excused
minority jurors displayed no potential for bias.6 On appeal from the dis-
1. 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984).
2. Id. at 1115 & 1118. Because of an inadequate record, the defense counsel, prosecutor and
state trial judge were unsure of the racial makeup of the jury during district court proceedings.
McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244, 1245, 1249 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). On appeal, however, both trial
counsel agreed that the jury that convicted McCray consisted of twelve white jurors. 750 F.2d at
1118.
3. Id. N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAW § 270.25(2)(b) (Consol. 1977) allows each side fifteen peremp-
tory challenges. The prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove seven blacks, one Hispanic,
and three whites. The defense counsel contended that the eight challenged minority venirepersons
were the only minority members on the jury panel. The prosecutor disputed this contention, arguing
that one alternate juror was black. The Second Circuit dismissed this argument because the selec-
tion of the alternate did not occur until after the defense counsel had challenged the prosecutor's
peremptory challenges. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1117 & 1133.
4. Id. at 1116. Defense counsel asserted that three excused minority jurors had not stated that
they knew anyone who had committed a crime or knew anyone accused or suspected of committing
a crime, and that one challenged black juror had stated that he had either a relative or a close friend
who had been a victim of a crime and who had been shot during a robbery. Id.
5. The district court granted the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976),
but stayed judgment pending appeal. McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
During voir dire, the defense counsel moved for a mistrial or in the alternative for a hearing to
inquire into the motivations underlying the prosecution's peremptory challenges. 750 F.2d at 1115.
The trial court denied these motions, relying on the prosecutor's denial of racial motivation. People
v. McCray, 104 Misc. 2d 782, 783, 429 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed McCray's conviction, relying on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965),
discussed infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text. People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 549, 443
N.E.2d 915, 919, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441,445 (1982). The United States Supreme Court denied McCray's
petition for certiorari. McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983). Five justices dissented, however,
from the Court's denial of certiorari. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
6. During voir dire, opposing counsel excused members of the jury panel by exercising either
challenges for cause or peremptory challenges. See generally Babcock, Voir Dire" "Preserving Its
Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545 (1975). A successful challenge for cause requires trial
court approval. Potential jurors may be excluded for predispositions that impair their obligation to
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trict court's grant of McCray's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the
Second Circuit held: that a state prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges to excuse jurors solely on the basis of their race violates the ac-
cused's federal constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury.7
The Supreme Court has long required that the process of selecting ju-
ror pools must respect the defendant's constitutional right to equal pro-
tection.8 In Strauder v. West Virginia,9 the Supreme Court held that a
state statute that limited jury service to white males denied a black de-
fendant equal protection. 1° Similarly, in Carter v. Texas," the Supreme
Court held that a jury commissioner's systematic exclusion of blacks
from the grand jury list violated the defendant's right to equal
protection.12
render an impartial verdict. The challenge for cause is also allowed when the juror is related to one
of the parties or has a historical connection to the case. Babcock, supra, at 549. Peremptory chal-
lenges, however, allow counsel to automatically excuse jurors without any reason. N.Y. CRIM.
PaOC. LAW § 270.25 (Consol. 1977). The automatic exclusion of the prospective juror pursuant to a
peremptory challenge is a statutory, not a constitutional, right. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,219
(1965). In theory, peremptory challenges insure an impartial jury by providing both parties with an
opportunity to exclude biased jurors who for some reason are not removable by challenges for cause.
7. 750 F.2d at 1128-29. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The court
also affirmed the district court's conclusion that McCray had established a prima facie sixth amend-
ment violation, but vacated the judgment and remanded for an evidentiary hearing because the pros-
ecution never had an opportunity to rebut. 750 F.2d at 1133-34.
In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965), the Court explained that "[t]he function of the
[peremptory] challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the
parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence before
them, and not otherwise." The peremptory challenge also facilitates voir dire by allowing counsel to
probe prospective jurors for bias without the fear that the examination may create an unremovable
hostile juror. Id at 219-20.
8. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally Note, Peremptory Challenges-Systematic Ex-
clusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 Miss. L.J. 157, 158 (1967).
9. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
10. Id. at 309. The Court also found that exclusion of blacks from the jury selection process
infringed upon the rights of the class as a whole, denying them the "privilege of participating equally
... in the administration of justice." Id at 308; see also Virginia v. Rivers, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
11. 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
12. Id. at 444; see also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Patton v. Mississippi, 332
U.S. 463 (1967). To establish a prima facie equal protection claim for exclusion of potential jurors
from a jury selection process, the defendant must show that the process excluded a distinct class of
persons qualified for jury service. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478, 480 (1954) (citing Norris
v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935)). In Hernandez, the Court applied the test of systematic exclusion
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In Swain v. Alabama, 3 the Supreme Court applied a different equal
protection standard to the exclusion of minorities from petit juries by
peremptory challenges.' 4 The prosecutor in Swain used six of eight per-
emptory challenges to exclude all black members of the jury pool.'" No
blacks ever served on petit juries in the county in which the defendant
was tried, and in criminal cases the prosecutors "consistently and sys-
tematically" used their challenges to exclude blacks.16  The Court
stressed, however, that the nature of peremptory challenges precludes ju-
dicial inquiry into an attorney's motivations.17
The Court in Swain established a presumption that the prosecutor uses
peremptory challenges "to obtain a fair and impartial jury."18 The de-
fendant can rebut the presumption by proving that the prosecutor sys-
tematically excluded black jurors in all types of cases over a period of
time.' 9 However, defendants have had little success in rebutting the
Swain presumption.2" In United States v. Carter,2' for example, the
Eighth Circuit held that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to
exclude eighty-one percent of all blacks available to serve on petit juries
did not rebut the Swain presumption.22
of identifiable groups to persons of Mexican descent. Id. The Court has also considered the system-
atic exclusion of women from the jury selection process. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
Once the defendant establishes a prima facie equal protection claim, the burden shifts to the state
to rebut the defendant's claim. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 238 (1965); Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 481 (1954). The state's assertion that it lacked discriminatory motive, and that
the statute excluded the entire group as unqualified, is insufficient to rebut the prima facie equal
protection violation. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598-99 (1934).
13. 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (plurality opinion).
14. Id. at 222. Justice Harlan joined the plurality, emphasizing that the Court did not uphold a
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors. Id. at 228. Instead, he found that
the petitioner failed to show that the exclusion resulted solely from the prosecution's challenges. Id.
15. Id. at 205.
16. Id. at 223; see also id. at 231-32 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 220. See supra note 7 (discussing peremptory challenges).
18. Id. at 222.
19. Id. at 223.
20. See, eg., Weathersby v. Morris, 708 F.2d 1493, 1496-97 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 719 (1984); see also Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practice in Capital Cases: An
Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MicH. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1982) (criticizing the
Swain standard); Note, The Defendant's Right to Object to Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory
Challenge, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1770 (1979) (the Swain burden of proof is insurmountable); Note,
supra note 8, at 163 (an insurmountable burden of proof renders Swain unworkable).
21. 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975).
22. Id. at 850. Defendants have been equally unsuccessful in rebutting the Swain presumption
in state courts. See, eg., State v. Davis, 529 S.W.2d 10, 16-19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Rogers v. State,
257 Ark. 144, 146-50, 515 S.W.2d 79, 81-83 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975). But see State
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Four states have rejected the Swain approach while interpreting their
own constitutions, viewing its standard as unrealistic.23 In the leading
case, People v. Wheeler,24 the California Supreme Court found that a
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from a petit
jury solely on the basis of "group association" violated the defendant's
right under the California Constitution to a trial by an impartial jury.25
The court stated that a defendant must show that the persons excluded
were members of an identifiable group and that the prosecutor likely
challenged these persons because of their group association.26 The prose-
cutor must then prove that minority jurors were excluded because of spe-
cific bias reasonably related to the case.27
v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162, 1164-65 (La. 1979) (prosecutor admitted practice of excluding
blacks).
23. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 287, 583 P.2d 748, 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 910
(1978); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 486-88,
387 N.E.2d 499, 515-16, cert denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). But see State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d
1162, 1164-65 (La. 1979) (Swain standard met); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751, 753-54 (La. 1979)
(Swain standard met).
24. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
25. Id. at 277, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903. The court held that the California
Constitution, Article I, § 16, entitles a defendant to a petit jury "that is as near an approximation of
the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of random draw permits." Id. The prosecu-
tor had not made a colorable effort to discover any specific bias and had not attempted to challenge
any of the black jurors for cause. Id. The court viewed the removal of jurors with a specific bias
towards the parties or the issues as the purpose of all challenges. Id. at 274, 583 P.2d at 760, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 901. Consequently, the exercise of peremptory challenges to remove a group of jurors
on the assumption that they share a general, or group, bias towards group-member defendants ex-
ceeds the scope of the prerogative that the system confers upon the prosecution. Id. The court
completely rejected the presumption that members of minorities cannot serve as impartial jurors
when the defendant is also a member of a minority. Id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
902.
26. Id. at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The court rejected Swain because no
defendant could realistically hope to sustain its burden. Id. at 286, 583 P.2d at 768, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
909. In State v. Crispin, 94 N.M. 486, 488, 612 P.2d 716, 718 (Ct. App. 1980), the court found that
"improper systematic exclusion by use of peremptory challenges can be shown... where the abso-
lute number of challenges in the one case raises the inference of systematic acts by the prosecutor."
But see State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486-87 (Fla. 1984), stating that the exclusion of a significant
number of black jurors does not automatically require the trial judge to inquire into the prosecutor's
motivations.
27. 22 Cal. 3d at 281-82, 583 P.2d at 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 906. The prosecution's proof
need not establish a challenge for cause. Id. Judge Richardson dissented because the statute did not
require any reason to use a peremptory challenge. Id. at 288, 583 P.2d at 769, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
Additionally, Judge Richardson supported the Swain Court's view that peremptory challenges based
upon even racial considerations further the end of securing an impartial jury. Id. at 389, 583 P.2d at
770, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 911. He criticized the majority's belief that a mixing of representative goups
would result in impartiality, as opposed to deadlock. Id. at 292, 583 P.2d at 771-72, 148 Cal. Rptr.
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Although Swain appears to insulate a prosecutor's peremptory chal-
lenges from an equal protection attack, the jury selection process must
also satisfy sixth amendment considerations. 28 The sixth amendment re-
quires that juror pools represent a cross-section of the community where
the defendant stands trial.29 The cross-section rule does not require that
the petit jury actually reflect a cross-section of the community. 0 The
Supreme Court has relied on the cross-section rule to invalidate jury se-
lection practices at the stages of assembling the venire3t or empanelling
the petit jury.32 A majority of courts addressing the issue conclude, how-
ever, that the cross-section rule does not restrict the exercise of peremp-
at 913. Commentators criticized Wheeler's failure to define the cognizable groups to which it refers.
See, e.g., Comment, A New Standard for Peremptory Challenges: People v. Wheeler, 32 STAN. L.
REv. 189, 199-203 (1979).
28. Three years after Swain, the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment was incorpo-
rated in the fourteenth amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
29. See, eg., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (purpose of the cross-section rule is to
enable the jury to effectively function as a prophylactic against prosecutor and judge by drawing
upon the community's common sense judgment and to allow community participation in the admin-
istration of justice).
30. Id. at 538.
31. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
statute that precluded the selection of women for jury service who had not filed a written declaration
of their desire to serve. The Court found that the statute effectively excluded women from jury
service, thereby violating the cross-section rule. Id. at 533; see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,
360 (1979) (invalidating a statute exempting women from jury service upon request); Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (remanded, on due process grounds, for a hearing on the white defend-
ant's allegation that the state had systematically excluded blacks from grand and petit juries); Bul-
lard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946) (barred exclusion of women from federal jury
service); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (held routine exclusion of wage-
earners improper); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (held limitation on venirewomen
to those who belonged to specific civic organizations improper).
32. The Supreme Court has applied the cross-section rule to a variety of issues including:
(1) jury size, Balleu v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (five-member jury too small); Williams v. Flor-
ida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (six members is sufficient size to comprise cross-section); (2) unanimity,
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410-11 (1972) (rule does not prohibit verdicts of I1-1 or 10-2);
and (3) challenges for cause, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518-20 (1968) (improper to
uphold challenge for cause on basis of juror's opposition to capital punishment). But see Wainwright
v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852, 861-63 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., and Brennan, J., dissenting, respectively).
Both Justices Rehnquist and Brennan viewed Witherspoon as grounded in the sixth amendment.
Justice Rehnquist, however, saw the cross-section rule as balancing a defendant's right to an impar-
tial jury against the system's need to challenge a potential juror for bias. Id. at 852 n.5. Justice
Brennan argued that Witherspoon guarantees that a jury will represent a cross-section of the commu-
nity. Id. at 861.
Lower federal courts addressing the cross-section rule argue that it does not preclude the use of
peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors who oppose the death penalty. Dobbert v. Strick-
land, 718 F.2d 1518, 1524-25 (11th Cir. 1983); Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067, 1070 (5th Cir.
1982).
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tory challenges.33
With respect to the venire, the elements of a prima facie sixth amend-
ment violation are as follows: (1) the excluded group must be a "distinc-
tive" group in the community; (2) the representation of the group in
venires must not be fair and reasonable in relation to its representation in
the community; and (3) the underrepresentation must result from sys-
tematic exclusion of the group during the jury selection process.34 The
defendant need not show that the jury was in fact biased. 35 When the
defendant establishes a prima facie sixth amendment violation, the bur-
den shifts to the prosecution to rebut the contention of systematic
exclusion.
36
In McCray, a majority of the Supreme Court denied McCray's petition
for certiorari but indicated its willingness to reconsider Swain.37 Justice
Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and Powell, suggested that racially
motivated use of peremptory challenges may warrant future considera-
tion.38 Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from the denial of certi-
orari.39 Justice Marshall opined that because Swain was decided prior to
the application of the sixth amendment to the states, the Court should
reconsider Swain in light of sixth amendment considerations.' Finally,
Justice Marshall urged that the cross-section rule should be extended to
33. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Thomp-
son, 730 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1319-20 (8th Cir.
1983) (en banc), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 744 (1984); Weathersby v. Morris, 708 F.2d 1493, 1497 (9th
Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 719 (1984); People v. Williams, 97 111. 2d 252, 278-79, 454 N.E.2d
220, 242-33 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2364 (1984). But see Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp.
1273, 1285-86 (E.D. Ark.), stay granted, 583 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Ark. 1983); People v. Wheeler, 22
Cal. 3d 258, 276-77, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 903 (1978); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d
481 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 482-83, 387 N.E.2d 499, 513, cert. denied,
444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 488, 612 P.2d 716, 718 (Ct. App. 1980).
34. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
35. See, eg., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538-39 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
36. See, eg., Castenda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 241 (1976)).
37. McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983).
38. Id. at 961-63. Justice Stevens, however, reasoned that the issue of racially motivated per-
emptory challenges warranted further consideration by the lower courts. Justice Stevens viewed the
states as laboratories that develop competing formulas, based upon their own constitutions, from
which the Court could select the most viable theory. Furthermore, Justice Stevens noted the absence
of any conflict in the federal courts, implying that the lower federal courts should reconsider Swain
despite its precedential status. Id.
39. Id. at 963 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
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empanelled petit juries.4 1
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
granted McCray a writ of habeas corpus on both sixth amendment and
equal protection grounds.42 The court reasoned that the sixth amend-
ment's cross-section rule would become meaningless if a prosecutor
could use peremptory challenges to exclude all black venirepersons.43
Furthermore, the court concluded that Swain was no longer good law,
relying on the apparent willingness of the Supreme Court to reevaluate
Swain."
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court's sixth
amendment analysis.45  Judge Kearse asserted that peremptory chal-
lenges were subject to scrutiny under the sixth amendment. 46  She con-
41. Id. Justice Marshall felt that the cross-section rule was otherwise meaningless. Justice
Marshall also noted that "Swain is inconsistent with the rule established in other jury selection cases
that a prima facie violation [of the equal protection clause] arises from a showing that an all-white
jury was selected and that the selection process incorporated a mechanism susceptible to discrimina-
tory application, irrespective of when in the process that opportunity arose." Id. (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
42. McCray v. Abrams, 576 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
43. Id. (citing McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). The
court concluded that the inevitable result of ignoring racially based peremptory challenges would be
an inherently biased jury system. Id.
44. Id. at 1246, 1249. The court recognized that if Swain controlled, McCray could not prevail.
Id. at 1246-47. The district court rejected Swain for five reasons: (1) the Swain test is practically
impossible to satisfy, id. at 1247; (2) Swain provides no remedy for the first victims of discrimination
in a particular jurisdiction, id.; (3) sixth amendment cases since Swain dilute the validity of the
Swain Court's assumption that racially based peremptory challenges do not implicate federally guar-
anteed rights, id. at 1247-48 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)); (4) state court devel-
opments since Swain dilute the validity of the Swain Court's assumption that inquiry into the
motives underlying prosecutorial peremptory challenges would violate tradition, id. at 1248-49 (cit-
ing People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 263, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978)); and (5) no compel-
ling governmental purpose justifies racially based peremptory challenges, id. at 1248 (citing Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
The court therefore adopted the Wheeler approach. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text
(discussing Wheeler). The court found that the record established a prima facie case, but concluded
that the trial court should have required an attempt at rebuttal. 576 F. Supp. at 1249.
45. McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984). The court held that McCray established
a prima facie sixth amendment violation, but vacated and remanded for further proceedings to allow
the prosecution an opportunity to rebut.
46. Id. at 1128-31. Judge Kearse based her conclusion on three grounds. First, peremptory
challenges as creatures of statute must yield when they conflict with a constitutional right. Second,
Swain indicates that peremptory challenges are not completely immune from judicial scrutiny.
Third, no meaningful distinction exists between exclusion of identifiable groups for the venire and for
the petit jury; either exclusion undermines the purposes of the cross-section rule. Id.
Drawing upon prior Supreme Court opinions, the Second Circuit concluded that the sixth amend-
ment requires the venire to represent a fair cross-section because the defendant must have a reason-
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cluded that the sixth amendment prevents racially motivated exercise of
peremptory challenges.4 7 Judge Kearse, writing for the majority, how-
ever, refused to accept the lower court's modification of Swain.48 Despite
her disagreement with the fundamental premises of Swain, Judge Kearse
felt compelled to follow its unequivocal standards regarding equal pro-
tection attacks on racially motivated use of peremptory challenges.49
Judge Meskill, dissenting, criticized the majority opinion as contrary
to the dictates of Swain, regardless of subsequent sixth amendment devel-
opments.5" Additionally, Judge Meskill asserted that the majority opin-
ion drastically limited the usefulness of the peremptory challenge,
ignored the obvious negative impact on defensive use of peremptory chal-
lenges,51 failed to confront the extreme breadth of its analysis,52 and ig-
nored the time, effort and expense necessary to implement its
able chance that the petit jury will also represent a cross section. Id. at 1124-28 (citing Duren v.
Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Balleu v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)).
The court emphasized that it was not holding that the sixth amendment requires affirmative steps to
ensure that the petit jury represent a cross section, but rather only that it prohibits steps that inter-
fere with the possibility. Id. at 1129.
47. Id. at 1131. To secure an impartial jury, a prosecutor can eliminate venirepersons who
exhibit bias, but not when the only basis for finding bias are the "fallacious and pernicious" notions
that group affiliation engenders bias and that minority groups are less fair and impartial than major-
ity groups. Id.
The court chose to apply the sixth amendment test espoused in Duren for establishing a prima
facie violation. Id. Thus, to establish a prima facie sixth amendment violation, the claimant must
show that (1) the allegedly excluded group constitutes a cognizable group in the community and
(2) there is a substantial likelihood that the prosecutor excused the group-member venirepersons
solely on the basis of group affiliation. Id. at 1131-32. The burden then shifts to the government to
rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that the exclusion resulted from ra-
daily neutral peremptory challenges. Id. at 1132. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
The rebuttal need not show a reason that would support a challenge for cause; it need only show
germane reasons other than group affiliation. 750 F.2d at 1132.
48. Id. at 1118, 1130.
49. Id. at 1121-24, 1130. The court found "fanciful" the Swain Court's statement that there
was no equal protection violation because both blacks and whites are subject to peremptory chal-
lenges, concluding that only blacks, as the minority, could be totally excluded. Id. at 1121. Finally,
the court noted the tragedy of allowing an artificial limitation upon the opportunity for blacks to
participate in the judicial system, thus perpetuating an "invidious proposition of racial inferiority."
Id at 1122. The court did not believe, however, that Swain established the standard for sixth
amendment challenges. Id. at 1124.
50. Id. at 1137 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1138-39. He perceived assumptions of group bias as essential to an attorney's effec-
tive service to his client, id., and predicted the end of the peremptory challenge as an effective jury
selection tool, id. at 1139.
52. Id. He asserted that the term "cognizable group" was uncontrollably broad, allowing con-
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procedures. 53
The Second Circuit reasonably concluded that sixth amendment prin-
ciples mandated a departure from Swain's restrictive approach to a crim-
inal defendant's claim of improper use of peremptory challenges. Absent
some restraint on a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude
minority jurors, the cross-section rule, applied at the venire selection
stage, becomes meaningless.54
Judge Meskill argued that just as the flexibility inherent in peremptory
challenges outweighed equal protection rights in Swain,5 5 so does that
flexibility outweigh sixth amendment rights.56 Such a fixed preference for
statutory procedures over constitutional rights, however, is difficult to
justify.57 Because the traditional goal of peremptory challenges is to se-
cure an impartial jury, courts should disallow such challenges when
made for any other purpose.5"
Although Judge Meskill overstates the breadth of the "cognizable
group" standard,59 his criticism of the majority's failure to define the
nature of the groups to which its standard refers is justified. The difficul-
stitutional challenges to the exclusion of "men, women, old people, young people, laborers, profes-
sionals, Democrats, Republicans ...." Id.
In fact the Supreme Court defines cognizable groups more narrowly. See, eg., Casteneda v. Par-
tida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (group defined by national origin); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975) (group defined by sex); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (group defined by race); see
also Comment, A New Standard for Peremptory Challenges People v. Wheeler, 32 STAN. L. REV.
189, 199 (1979). But see Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (although group excluded was
black, court defined group as "any large and identifiable segment of the community").
53. Id. at 1140 & n.6. The Second Circuit voted against en banc reconsideration of Judge
Kearse's decision. McCray v. Abrams, 756 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1985). The court found en bane
review inappropriate given the state's concession that a prosecutor may not use peremptory chal-
lenges solely on the basis of race.
54. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
56. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1135 & n.1 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Judge Meskill read Swain as
holding that peremptory challenges are immune from constitutional scrutiny. Id.; accord The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REv. 70, 194 (1983).
57. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (a constitu-
tional claim must prevail over a nonconstitutional claim).
58. See Note, Systematic Exclusion of Cognizable Groups by Use of Peremptory Challenges, 11
FORDHAM L. REV. 927, 941 (1983). The Note suggests that the right to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges expands and contracts in proportion to its ability to serve the goal of securing a fair and
impartial jury. England eliminated prosecutorial peremptory challenges in 1305, recognizing the
challenge as a tool meant only to protect the accused. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 243
(1965).
59. See supra note 52.
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ties inherent in the Swain test,6° however, suggest that Judge Meskill's
characterization of the majority's approach as unworkable lacks merit.
Furthermore, a number of state courts already utilize the majority's ap-
proach successfully. 61 The majority's standard permits the defendant an
opportunity to assert his constitutional rights, without unduly inhibiting
the free exercise of peremptory challenges.62
McCray is a realistic reassessment of Swain. The Second Circuit's re-
evaluation of Swain strikes a sound balance between the peremptory
challenge and a defendant's constitutional rights. Given post-Swain deci-
sions that establish the cross-section rule, the difficulty a defendant has in
meeting the Swain burden of proof, and the availability of alternative
approaches preserving peremptory challenges and constitutional rights,
McCray's readjustment is good law.63
WG.D.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 18-22.
61. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text. Judge Meskill also criticizes the majority's
approach for precluding the defendant's use of racially motivated peremptory challenges. A number
of courts, however, point out that the sixth amendment cross-section rule should act as a bar to
racially motivated peremptory challenges by either the prosecutor or defense counsel. The sixth
amendment guarantees the defendant the right to an impartial jury, not to a jury that is biased in his
favor. The Wheeler court stated:
When a white defendant is charged with a crime against a black victim, the black commu-
nity as a whole has a legitimate interest in participating in the trial proceedings; that inter-
est will be defeated if the prosecutor does not have the power to thwart any defense attempt
to strike all blacks from the jury on the ground of group bias alone.
People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282 n.29, 583 P.2d 748, 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 906-07 n.29
(1978). Accord Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489-90 n.35, 387 N.E.2d 499, 517 n.35
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979). Contra United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240, 250 n.8 (2d Cir. 1977).
63. Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Batson v. Kentucky, cert. granted, 105 S.
Ct. 2111 (1985). In Batson, the prosecutor exercised four of six peremptory challenges to exclude all
black venirepersons from the panel. The issue raised in McCray, therefore, will be decided by the
Supreme Court in the near future.
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